SPKI/SDSI is a novel public-key infrastructure emphasizing naming, groups, ease-of-use, and exible authorization. To access a protected resource, a client must present to the server a proof that the client is authorized; this proof takes the form of a \certi cate chain" proving that the client's public key is in one of the groups on the resource's ACL.
Introduction
This paper studies the problem of \certi cate chain discovery" within the SPKI/SDSI (\s-p-k-i/sudsy") public-key infrastructure.
The problem addressed here is a fundamental one. Any security mechanism should be able to answer the basic authorization question, \Is principal X authorized to do Y?" The di culty of answering this question depends primarily on the expressiveness of language used to make elementary security assertions.
If the language used to make security assertions is too exible, then the authorization question may be undecidable. Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman 14] give such an undecidability result for a general protection system based on the access matrix model.
On the other hand, Jones, Lipton, and Snyder 16] give an e cient (linear time) algorithm for deciding the authorization question in the take-grant model.
More recently, Blaze, Feigenbaum, and Strauss 3] show that \compliance checking" (their term for answering the authorization question) in their PolicyMaker model is in general undecidable, and that it remains NP-hard even when restricted in several natural ways. They also give a polynomial-time algorithm for a special case of their problem. The PolicyMaker scheme has evolved into their \KeyNote" trust management system 2].
We believe that SPKI/SDSI provides an elegant 2 and simple framework for naming and authorization in a distributed environment. Its conceptual framework is natural and easy to understand; it is expressive enough for a large range of applications. The basic point of the current paper is that the expressive power of SPKI/SDSI does not come at the expense of computational di culty. We demonstrate here that there is an e cient algorithm for answering the authorization question within SPKI/SDSI.
We imagine the following typical scenario. A client (say, Alice) makes a request to access a resource which (unknown to her) is protected. The server replies that access can only be granted if Alice can prove that she is a member of one of the groups G 1 , G 2 , or G 3 . That is, the access-control list (ACL) for the protected resource speci es that access may only be granted to members of those groups. Alice has a collection of certi cates that she may use in her proof. She nds a rst certi cate C 1 that states that all members of group H are members of group G 2 , and another certi cate C 2 that states that she (actually, her public key) is a member of group H. The sequence (C 1 ; C 2 ) is a \certi cate chain" proving that she may access the protected resource. She sends this sequence to the server, signs her request to the protected resource with her private key, and gains access.
Informally the technical problem is the following: given an access-control list for a protected resource, and a collection of SPKI/SDSI certi cates, determine whether a given principal or set of principals, represented by their public keys, is authorized to access the protected resource. Because of the way that certi cates can be chained in SPKI/SDSI, the problem is non-trivial; the fact that a polynomial-time algorithm exists for this problem is interesting.
The current paper is self-contained but brief, and the reader is encouraged to consult the references for additional background and motivation.
Section 2 gives a brief historical synopsis of the evolution of SPKI/SDSI.
The paper begins by treating the SPKI/SDSI naming subsystem. Section 3 introduces SPKI/SDSI names and gives our favorite representation of name certi cates: as \rewrite rules" for transforming one string or certi cate into another. Section 4 gives a simple graph-theoretic algorithm for evaluating the meaning of a SPKI/SDSI name in the absence of \ex-tended" names. The case for extended names is made in Section 5, where it is shown how extended names can increase ease-of-use and modularity.
Section 6 then shows how two certi cates can be composed to yield another one. This certi cate composition operation is the fundamental \inference rule" of SPKI/SDSI. An e cient algorithm for computing the \name-reduction closure" of a given set of certi cates is then described, proved correct, and analyzed.
Section 7 introduces authorization certi cates, or \auth certs," and shows how they can also be represented as rewrite rules.
Section 8 gives an overview of the general certi cate chain discovery problem, by way of a speci c example. Section 9 then gives the details of our certi cate-chain discovery algorithm, including an analysis of its running time.
Finally, Section 10 discusses how the certi catechain discovery algorithm can be extended to handle \threshold subjects," where more than one party must sign an access request in order for it to be honored.
We assume the reader has a basic familiarity with public-key cryptography and digital signatures (see for example Menezes et al. 18] ), although the details of particular signature schemes are not important here.
SPKI/SDSI History
In 1996 Lampson and Rivest 21] proposed a new public-key infrastructure, called \a Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure," abbreviated \SDSI" , and pronounced \sudsy." Its most interesting feature is probably its decentralized name space. In SDSI, the owner of each public key can create a local name space relative to that key. These name spaces can be linked together in a exible and powerful manner to enable chains of authorization and de ne groups of authorized principals. SDSI's naming scheme has generated some interest in its own right; for example, Abadi 1] has studied SDSI's nam-3 ing scheme in some detail.
Concurrently, Carl Ellison, Bill Frantz, Brian Thomas, Tatu Ylonen and others developed a \Sim-ple Public Key Infrastructure," or \SPKI," pronounced \s-p-k-i", which emphasized exceptional simplicity of design and a exible means of specifying authorizations.
The SDSI and SPKI e orts were both motivated in part by the perceived complexity of the X.509 publickey infrastructure, and also by its perceived lack of power and exibility.
In 1997 the SDSI and SPKI e orts were merged; the resulting synthesis has been called \SPKI/SDSI." Sometimes, for brevity, it has been called just \SPKI" or just \SDSI," but the reference is now always to the merged design.
A SPKI working group of the IETF was formed in 1996 that has continued to re ne the design 15]. Various RFC's and Internet drafts 8, 9, 10, 11] document this work. Two web sites 20, 7] give further pointers to work on SPKI/SDSI.
Several MIT EECS Master's theses 13, 19, 6, 5] have studied various algorithmic and implementation aspects of SPKI/SDSI. Of most relevance is JeanEmile Elien's master's thesis 6], which focuses on the certi cate chain discovery problem and gives an early version of the algorithm presented in this paper. Elien's thesis is especially recommended reading for further background and discussion both of SPKI/SDSI in general and the certi cate chain discovery problem in particular. The algorithm presented here is an extension of the one presented in his thesis.
We note that the terminology used here may di er in small respects from that used in other SPKI/SDSI documentation; we don't expect this to cause the reader any di culties.
SPKI/SDSI Names
We begin with a description of naming within SPKI/SDSI, leaving authorization for later. We do this for several reasons:
The naming scheme within SPKI/SDSI is a fascinating object of study in its own right, with great exibility and interesting computational problems.
The SPKI/SDSI naming scheme is orthogonal to and conceptually separable from the authorization scheme.
It will be easier to understand the issues arising in the full SPKI/SDSI scheme once the naming subsystem is fully understood.
In SPKI/SDSI there is a local name space associated with every public key. There are no no global names in SPKI/SDSI. A local name is a pair consisting of a public key and an identi er.
A public key can sign statements (certi cates) binding one of its local names to a value. Values can be speci ed indirectly in terms of other names, so the name spaces can become linked and interdependent in a exible and powerful manner.
Keys.
In SPKI/SDSI, all principals are represented by their public keys. A principal is an individual, process, or active entity whose messages are distinctively recognizable because they are digitally signed by the public key that represents them. It is convenient to say that the principal is its public key.
De nition 1 We let K denote the set of public keys.
We typically use K; K A ; K B ; K 0 ; K 1 ; K 2 ; : : : to denote speci c public keys. We omit discussion of the corresponding secret keys. In particular, when we say that a message was signed by key K i , we mean that it was signed by the secret key whose corresponding public key is K i .
In practice, a key is represented by a data structure that speci es the algorithm name (e.g. RSA with MD5 hashing and PKCS1 formatting) and the associated parameters (e.g. modulus n = 3871099 : : :8763 and exponent e = 17) . In this paper we use the metasymbols such as K i to stand for such data structures.
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Identi ers.
Because the most important function of a name is to serve as a mnemonic handle for some human user, it is important to be able to create names rather freely using well-chosen identi ers.
De nition 2 An identi er is a word over some given standard alphabet. We let A denote the set of all possible identi ers.
Our examples use speci c identi ers such as A; B; Alice; Bob; : : :, usually in typewriter font.
3.3 Local names and local name spaces.
Each (public) key has its own associated local name space; there is no global name space or even a hierarchy of name spaces. SPKI/SDSI doesn't require a \root" or \root key"; it can be built \bottom-up" in a distributed manner from a collection of local name spaces.
De nition 3 A local name is a sequence of length two consisting of a key K followed by a single identi er.
Example. Typical local names might be \K Alice" or \K project-team." Here K represents an actual public key.
Notation 1 We say that the local name \K A" belongs to the local name space of key K. We let N L denote the set of all local names, and let N L (K) denote the local name space of key K.
Local names in di erent name spaces are unrelated to each other, even if they use the same identi er. Local names may be chosen in an arbitrary manner. In one local name space the identi ers might be people's names, in another name space identi ers might be nicknames, social security numbers, phone numbers, IP addresses, credit-card numbers, organizational role names, committee names, or group names. The owner of the public key can decide arbitrarily what conventions he wishes to use when assigning names.
There are many reasons for one to use local names:
To provide a convenient user-friendly handle for referring to another principal. For example, it is much simpler to refer to \Bob" than to refer to the Bob's speci c public key \RSA-MD5 with parameters n = 3549 : : :413 and e = 17".
To provide a level of abstraction that separates the name one uses to refer to the principal from the keys the principal uses, since the latter may change. Notation 2 We let N E denote the set of all extended names. We let N = N L N E denote the set of all names. We let N E (K) denote the set of extended names beginning with key K, and let N(K), which we call the name space of key K, denote the set of all names (local or extended) beginning with key K.
The SPKI/SDSI \expressions" that we will be dealing with will be called terms; intuitively, a term is something that may have a value. In SPKI/SDSI values are always sets of keys.
De nition 5 We say that a term is either a key or a name. We let T = K N denote the set of all terms.
Section 5 discusses extended names in more detail, and describes their bene ts.
Certi cates.
SPKI/SDSI has two types of certi cates, or \certs": name certs, which provide a de nition for a local name, and authorization certs, or auth certs, which confer authorization on a key or a name.
Compared to X.509 public-key infrastructure schemes 12], our name cert is comparable to an \ID certi cate," and to some forms of \attribute certicates", while our auth cert is comparable to an \at-tribute certi cate" that conveys authorization. However, the details and semantics di er signi cantly, and the reader should not interpret these comments as more than a very crude approximation.
We defer further discussion of auth certs until Section 7, in order to focus for now on naming and name certi cates within SPKI/SDSI.
Name Certi cates.
A name cert provides a de nition of a local name in the issuer's local name space. Only key K may issue (that is, sign) certi cates for names in the local name space N L (K). A name cert C is a signed four-tuple (K; A; S; V ):
The issuer K is a public key; the certi cate is signed by K. 
Value of a key.
A public key is the simplest kind of a SPKI/SDSI term{it is a constant expression evaluating to itself (as a singleton set).
De nition 6 We de ne V C (K) = fKg for any public key K and any set C of certi cates.
Value of a local name.
A local name has a value that is a set of public keys; this value may be the empty set, a set containing a single key, or a set containing many keys. This value is determined by one or more name certi cates.
A local name, such as K Alice , need not have the same meaning as the local name K 0 Alice when K 6 = K 0 ; the owner of key K may de ne K Alice however he wishes, while the owner of key K 0 may similarly but independently de ne K 0 Alice in an arbitrary manner.
A name cert C = (K; A; S; V ) (intuitively, de ning local name K A in terms of subject S) should be understood as a signed statement by the issuer asserting that
(1) that is, every key in the value V(S) of subject S is also a key in the value V(K A) of local name K A.
One name certi cate does not invalidate others for the same local name; their e ect is cumulative. That is why the above equation says V(K A) V(S) and not V(K A) = V(S); each additional cert may add new elements to V(K A). A local name in SPKI/SDSI may thus, without any special fanfare, represent a group of public keys.
De nition 7 We de ne V C (T ) for any term T to be the smallest set of public keys that is consistent with any constraints of the form of equation (1) implied by the name certi cates in C.
By suitable interpretation and chaining as necessary, such certi cates imply a \meaning" for the local name: the meaning (or value) of the local name is a set of public keys. Figure 1 gives a typical example; it presents a set C of name certs and gives V C (T ) for various terms T.
We note SPKI/SDSI has no \negative certs"; you can't issue a cert to remove some key from a group.
One can also think of V(K A) as the set of keys that may \speak for" that name|see Lampson et al. 17] for a de nition of \speaks for." Any privileges or authorizations that have been given to the name are given to each key in its group.
Name Certs as Rewrite Rules
Here we explain how to represent a name certi cate as a \rewrite rule" operating on strings of symbols. The symbols used are keys and identi ers. A rewrite rule allows one to replace a given sequence of symbols with another.
Rewrite rules are expressive enough to represent both the de nitions given by name certs and the delegations expressed by auth certs.
By starting with a given name and performing rewrites in all possible ways (using a given set of certi cates), one can determine the value of a name. One can use a similar procedure to nd out which keys are authorized to perform a given action, as we shall see in Section 9.
Our representation of name certs as rewrite rules suppresses the validity speci cation. This omission is justi ed, since in practice any certi cates that are not currently valid will be set aside initially, and ignored thereafter.
We represent a name certi cate C = (K; A; S; V ) as the rewrite rule:
KA ?! S :
We may also write the syntax of a name rule as:
KA ?! T 
An equivalent de nition is:
V(K 0 A 2 A 3 : : : A n ) : (3) Example. Let K 0 denote the MIT public key, K 1 denote the EECS public key, and let K 2 denote
Rivest's public key. Then Figure 1 gives an example of a set of name certs and the values of the names it de nes.
A Typical Example

A Simple Case: No Extended Names
In this section we show that it is easy to nd the value of a term given a collection of SPKI/SDSI name certs that have no extended names as subjects, that is, when every subject is either just a key or a local name. In practice we expect that many or most certi cates will be of this form. In Section 9 we give an e cient algorithm for the general case. The problem we are concerned with here is the problem of evaluating the meaning V C (T ) of a term T, given a set of certi cates C that contain local names but no extended names.
Without loss of generality, we assume that T is a local name appearing in some certi cate in C. (If T is a key K, or if T doesn't appear in the certi cates at all, then the problem is trivial. In the rst case V C (K) = fKg; in the second case V C (T ) = ;.)
The following simple algorithm solves our problem:
Create The reason this algorithm works is that when there are no extended names present, the evaluation process does not create any names outside of those already present in the input set of certi cates. Thus we need merely to trace dependencies between the local names and keys appearing in the input. When extended names are present, this reasoning no longer applies, as we shall see.
The running time of our algorithm above to nd the meaning of a single term T is linear in the size of the input set C of certi cates when the second step above is implemented using an e cient graph-searching algorithm such as depth-rst search or breadth-rst search. (See Cormen et al. 4 ] for details.) The same algorithm and running time applies for the simpler problem of determining whether a given K is a member of V C (T ) for a given term T.
Extended names
Given the simplicity of the previous algorithm, one can reasonably ask: \why bother with extended 
Alice issues a name cert (4) binding her local name \K A Bob" to Bob's key K B . She de nes her local name \K A Carol" indirectly in terms of Bob's local name \K B CarolJones" with cert (5). In (6) she de nes her local name \K A Ted" with an extended name \K B CarolJones Ted", linking through both Bob and Carol's local name spaces. In (7){(9) she de nes the group \K A friends" to include Bob, Carol, and Ted, and in (10) she includes everyone in Bob's group \my-friends" in her group \friends".
In (11){(13) Bob gives symbolic names \Alice", \CarolJones", and \Frank" to Alice's key K A , Carol's key K C , and Frank's key K F , respectively. In (14){(15) he de nes his group \my-friends" to include Alice's and Frank's keys.
In (16) Carol de nes her local name \Ted" to refer to Ted's key K T .
It follows that:
V(K A Carol) = fK C g (18) V(K A Ted) = fK T g (19) V(K A friends) = fK B ; K C ; K T ; K A ; K F g (20) V(K B Alice) = fK A g (21) V(K B CarolJones) = fK C g
V(K B Frank) = fK F g
V(K B my-friends) = fK A ; K F g
V(K C Ted) = fK T g
Figure 1: A typical example of name certs.
EXTENDED NAMES
The graph corresponding to the certi cates of Figure 1 , except for the certi cates (6) and (10) which have extended names as subjects. Each key and local name appearing in the certi cates corresponds to a vertex, each certi cate corresponds to an edge.
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names at all?" Although, as we shall see, extended names can be handled e ciently, it is nonetheless fair to ask if they are worth the extra bother. For some applications it may indeed be the case that extended names are not really needed, and that by constraining certi cates to have only keys or local names as subjects one can simplify things a bit without paying too severe a penalty in terms of expressive power. The system so implemented would be a proper subset of standard SPKI/SDSI.
As an example, consider the certi cate set in Thus, we strongly endorse using extended names whenever possible to improve modularity and simplify the writing of ACL's.
In the next sections we see how to e ciently handle a set of certi cates with extended names. This turns out to be an interesting problem, since the simple graph-theoretic model used above is no longer adequate. Instead, we will need to return to our view of certi cates as \rewrite rules."
Composition of certs
In this section we de ne how a cert can be used to rewrite a string, or to rewrite another cert. This latter operation is also called the composition of certs (also called composition of rules), and is the fundamental operation of SPKI/SDSI.
In this section we de ne a \string" to be a term; later on when we are dealing with auth certs we shall expand this de nition slightly.
6.1 Using a cert to rewrite a string.
De nition 9 Suppose that S is a string, that C = L ?! R is a rewrite rule, and that L is a pre x of S: that is, S = LX for some (possibly empty) sequence X. Then we de ne S C to be the string S 0 = RX. We say say that we have rewritten the string S according to the rule C to obtain S 0 .
Example.
( We can also apply a rule C 2 to rewrite another rule C 1 to obtain C 3 = C 1 C 2 , by using C 2 to rewrite the subject (right-hand side) of C 1 .
De nition 10 Suppose C 1 is a rule of the form L 1 ?! R 1 ;
and suppose C 2 is a rule of the form
where L 2 is a pre x of R 1 . That is, R 1 = L 2 X for some (possibly empty) string X. Then we de ne the composition of rules C 3 = C 1 C 2 as
We say that we have rewritten C 1 (using C 2 ) to obtain C 3 . If L 2 is not a pre x of R 1 then C 1 C 2 is unde ned.
As 
Properties of composition of certs.
The important point about composition is that it represents the only \rule of inference" needed for reasoning within SPKI/SDSI. Someone holding valid certs C 1 and C 2 may infer C 3 = C 1 C 2 and treat it as a valid cert having the same status as any valid cert that had been actually issued.
We note that composition is not associative. For example, if
, whereas C 1 (C 2 C 3 ) is unde ned because (C 2 C 3 ) is unde ned. However, it is easy to show that (C 1 C 2 ) C 3 is de ned whenever C 1 (C 2 C 3 ) is de ned, so we may omit parentheses when desired and assume that \ " is left-associative:
We also note that in the composition C 3 = C 1 C 2 where C 1 and C 2 were both issued (and not inferred), it may be the case that C 1 was issued before C 2 or the reverse. that speci es her name \Carol" in terms of Bob's name \CarolJones". This gives SPKI/SDSI a certain exibility lacked by PKI systems that require a key to be created before it can be referred to.
6.4 Closure of a set of certs.
The notion of the closure of a set of certi cates is fundamental; the closure contains all certs that can be derived by composition from the given set of certs.
De nition 12 If C is a set of certi cates, we de ne the set C + , called the (transitive) closure of C, as the smallest set of certi cates that includes C as a subset and that is closed under composition of certi cates.
Informally, the closure C + contains all certi cates that can be inferred from C using any nite number of compositions. While the set C + need not be nite, each rule in C + has a nite-length derivation from the certi cates in C.
We shall later de ne a nite subset of the closure, called the \name-reduction closure," that is easy to compute, and just as useful.
6.5 Using closure to de ne the value of a name.
We can now see how the value of a name can be de ned in terms of the closure of a set of certi cates.
De nition 13 If S is a string and C is a set of certi cates, then S C = fS C : C 2 Cg : Informally, S C is the result of rewriting S in all possible ways, using certi cates from C. Given the utility of the closure, as seen above, it is of interest to compute it e ciently, if possible. But since the closure is potentially in nite, to be e cient we need to compute just the relevant parts of it quickly.
This subsection de nes the name-reduction closure C # of a set of certi cates C. If C is a set of certi cates, then the name-reduction closure C # of C is de ned to be the smallest set of certi cates containing C and closed under \name-reduction" (rewriting with reducing certicates). That is, if C # contains a certi cate C 1 and it also contains a compatible reducing certi cate C 2 , then C # must also contain C 1 C 2 .
Thus, to compute the name-reduction closure, we only perform rewritings that cause a reduction in the length of the right-hand side, until no more such rewritings can be done. This is clearly a nite process. More precisely, our algorithm for computing the name-reduction closure is the following: Name-reduction closure algorithm:
1. Initialize C 0 to be the input set C of certi cates. 2. As long as C 0 contains two compatible certi cates C 1 and C 2 such that C 2 is a reducing certi cate and C 1 C 2 is not yet in C 0 , add C 1 C 2 to C 0 . 3. Return C 0 as the computed value of C # .
To illustrate the operation of this algorithm, Figure 3 shows the closure and name-reduction closure of the certi cates from Figure 1 .
Before studying the running time of this algorithm, we examine some of the properties of C # .
6.7.1 Properties of the name-reduction closure.
The importance of the name-reduction closure of a set of certi cates is given by the following theorems, which shows that the name-reduction closure explicitly computes the values of terms appearing on the right-hand side of the input certi cates.
Theorem 1 Suppose that C is a set of certi cates, If n = 1 we are done, so assume that n > 1. Note that if n > 1, then C 1 is not reducing, since there would be no compatible certi cates C 2 (no name certi cates have just a key as their left-hand side). Similarly, C n must be a reducing certi cate, since R n is just the key K.
Let C i be the last non-reducing certi cate in the chain; thus i < n and C i+1 must be reducing. Therefore jR i j 2, and so C i and C i+1 must be compatible.
Therefore C i C i+1 is well de ned, and an element of C # . This implies that the certi cate chain (40) is not shortest possible, a contradiction. Therefore n = 1 and we are done.
The natural converse of this theorem also holds.
Theorem 2 Suppose that C is a set of certi cates, and that L ?! K is a cert in C # . Then there exists a cert C = (L ?! R) in C such that K 2 V(R). Proof: If C = C 1 C 2 : : : C n , then it follows easily from the de nitions and the fact that C # C + that C 1 is the desired certi cate C.
Running time of the name-reduction
closure algorithm.
Since the name-reduction closure algorithm is the most critical portion of our certi cate-chain discovery algorithm, we carefully analyze its running time in this section. (5) and (12) .
We believe that this algorithm is very practical, and that it will be exceptionally e ective in practice.
In this subsection, we give a polynomial bound on the running time of the name-reduction closure algorithm.
We rst give a worst-case bound on the running time, and show that it is tight. We then show that some realistic constraints on the input set of certicates make the running time of the algorithm much better. The algorithm doesn't change; it just runs faster when the input is not pathological.
Worst-case running time
Let C be the input set of certi cates. Suppose that C contains n certi cates, and that l is the length of the longest subject in any input certi cate.
The rst step in our analysis is to note that the maximum number of new certi cates that can be produced during name-reduction closure is O(n 2 l). ( We recall that \O-notation" is used for stating worst-case upper bounds to within an unspeci ed constant factor; the actual number of new certi cates produced in a particular instance may often be substantially less than this worst-case upper bound.)
We prove the bound as follows. A typical input certi cate of the form L ?! K i A 1 A 2 : : : A m :
can be rewritten by reducing certi cates to produce new certi cates only of the form L ?! K j A k A k+1 : : : A m for some j and k. That is, the subject of the resulting certi cate consists of some key K j followed by some su x of the subject of the certi cate. Since the choice of the starting certi cate, the choice of j, and the length of the su x are arbitrary, the bound follows.
To see that this bound is tight to within constant factors, consider the following \worst-case" set of certi cates: K ?! K 0 A l B j for 0 j < n; 
Unambiguous sets of certi cates
In practice, we expect that an input set of certi cates will not be as pathological as the input set (41){(43) above. For example, in practice we expect that an input set of certi cates will be unambiguous.
De nition 17 A set C of certi cates is said to be unambiguous if any certi cate C in C + is expressible in at most one way as the result of a certi cate chain bound for the general case. We expect even better behavior in practice, as we feel that it will often be the case that C # is proportional to jCj, so that the running time of our algorithm will be linear.
Production of certi cate chain
From the computation of the name-reduction closure, we can derive a chain of certi cates that demonstrates explicitly how any given certi cate is indeed in the closure. The process of reconstructing a certicate chain is primarily one of just working backwards through the computation. For example, using the certi cates of Figures 1  and 3 , we have that (38) = (33) (14) = (10) (4) (14) ; so the desired certi cate chain is just the sequence of certi cates (10); (4); (14) .
However, there is one issue that needs to be addressed, which is the representation of the certi cate chain itself. There are two plausible choices for the format of a certi cate chain: a linear format and a compressed format. Because the compressed format may be exponentially more compact than the linear format, and because it is just as easy to create and process as the linear format, we recommend the compressed format.
The linear format outputs the certi cates from C in an order C 1 ; C 2 ; : : : ; C t such that C = C 1 C 2 C t where C is the desired derived certi cate.
The problem with this format is that the length t of the certi cate chain may be exponential in the size n of the input certi cate set. 44) is 2 n+2 ? 2, by induction. However, this chain is highly repetitious, and can be represented much more compactly, as we now see.
Thus, it is of interest to have a compact format for certi cate chains that will be of polynomial size. The following \compressed" format works. Assume that C 1 ; : : : ; C n are the input certi cates.
:::
Here each i k and each j k is an integer in the range 1 to n + k ? 1. In the compressed format the output is a sequence of lines, where each line shows how a new certi cate can be derived by composing two previously input or derived certi cates. The nal certi cate is the desired certi cate. This format is the same as that given in Figures 1 and 3 .
The size of the compressed format is always polynomial in the size of the input (indeed, it is at most C # ). The compressed format is easy to produce and easy to check. See Elien's thesis 6] for some implementation details. This representation is never longer than the linear format, and may be exponentially shorter.
The compressed form is the most logical one to use|it re ects the process we use to do the chain discovery. The linear form is thus unnatural but forced by requiring someone to use just original (veri able) certi cates. The compressed form lets us use derived rules.
We thus recommend the use of the compressed format for e ciency's sake; there is no reason why a polynomial-time computation should have to work for exponential time to produce its output, as it might have to do for the linear format.
7 Auth Certs. Now that we have mastered SPKI/SDSI naming, we turn our attention to authorization certi cates, or \auth certs," and see how to adapt our previous algorithms to handle an input set of certi cates that contains both name and auth certs.
We will see how to represent auth certs as rewrite rules in such a way that the composition of certs remains well-de ned and satis es all of the desired properties (including delegation control).
Our nal algorithm for determining authorization and computing certi cate chains is then a combination of name-reduction closure and a graph-theoretic algorithm resembling that of Section 4.
The function of an auth cert is to grant or delegate a speci c authorization from the issuer to the subject.
An auth cert C is a signed ve-tuple (K; S; D; T; V ):
The issuer K is a public key, which signs the cert. The issuer is the one granting a speci c authorization.
The subject S is a term in T . The public keys in V(S) are receiving the grant of authorization.
The delegation bit, if true, grants each key in V(S) permission to further delegate to others the authorization it is receiving via this certi cate.
The authorization speci cation or authorization tag T speci es the speci c permission or permissions being granted. For example, it may specify the right to access a particular web site, read a certain le, or login to a particular machine.
The validity speci cation for an auth cert is the same as that for a name cert.
One auth certi cate does not invalidate others; their e ect is cumulative. (Again, there are no \neg-ative auth certs"; a permission granted is good until one of the relevant certs expires or becomes invalid.) SPKI/SDSI works by authorizing keys, rather than by authorizing names from some xed global name space. SPKI/SDSI names are used to de ne keys or groups of keys; the local but interlinked structure of SPKI/SDSI names makes this process exible and easy-to-use. 7 .1 Access-control lists.
In a security system with discretionary access control each protected resource has an associated accesscontrol list, or ACL, describing which principals have which permissions to access the resource.
The ease with which SPKI/SDSI allows one to describe groups of principals can make the writing of ACL's rather simple and straightforward. The ACL might typically list a single SPKI/SDSI group and its associated permissions. In some cases several groups might be listed, each with associated permissions.
Although the ACL may seem to be a new kind of data object, it can most naturally be interpreted as a convenient representation of one or more auth certs. We now describe this interpretation.
The issuer of an auth cert in an ACL is the owner of the protected resource. In SPKI/SDSI the special term \Self " is used to designate the key of the owner of the resource, although the owner's key itself could of course be used directly.
The subject of an auth cert in an ACL denotes recipients of the permission. More precisely, if S is the subject of an ACL auth cert, then any request for access to the protected resource that is signed by a key K in V(S) will be honored. Furthermore, if an ACL auth cert Self ?! S had the delegation bit turned on, then any auth cert issued by K 2 V(S) for the protected resource can be treated as if it were an original ACL auth cert issued by Self. (However, K can't grant access to resources to which it itself does not have access, and it may grant auth certs to grant less access right than it has itself.)
Auth certs as rewrite rules
In this section we see how to represent an auth cert as a rewrite rule, so that we may compose auth certs with each other, or with name certs, in a way that precisely models the desired semantics of SPKI/SDSI. To accomplish this, we adorn the auth rewrite rules with special \ticket" symbols whose presence enforces the desired behavior.
De nition 18 The special \ticket" symbols are \ 2"
(\a live ticket") or \ " (\a dead ticket"). The metasymbol \ 2" may be used to represent a \zombie" ticket that may be either live or dead. 1
A ticket may be thought of as a convenient artice to represent a particular authority or permission. (Elien 6] used the \turnstile" symbol \a" instead.) Tickets ensure that the composition of certs will have the desired behavior, as we shall see. For the purpose of our rewrite rules, however, a ticket is just a symbol, di erent than any key or identi er.
The ticket \2" is considered to be \live"|it represents a permission obtained with the delegation bit turned on, so it can be further delegated. The ticket \ " is considered to be \dead"|it represents a permission obtained with the delegation bit turned o , so it can not be delegated further.
To represent a ticket that may be either live or dead, we use the meta-symbol \2", the \zombie ticket." The zombie ticket doesn't actually appear in rewrite rules, but is used when discussing a rewrite rule having a ticket which may be either live or dead.
De nition 19 A string is either a term or a term followed by a ticket.
Examples of strings. In particular, an ACL entry is represented by a rewrite rule of the form:
where the subject S is some term.
Why auth rules have tickets.
We can now see why auth certs are represented as rewrite rules with tickets. The presence of the tickets prevents the auth cert from being inappropriately used in a composition as a name cert. For example, it is not correct, according to the SPKI/SDSI composition rules, to compose the following name and auth certs:
Were the tickets not used, this might erroneously be considered a legal composition. With tickets, the two certs are not compatible. This restriction is consistent with the viewpoint that the purpose of an auth cert is to grant permission, and not to rewrite names. Only name certs can be used to rewrite names.
We now extend our previous discussion of the composition of name certs to consider the general composition of two certi cates, where either one or both may be auth certs. Our de nition of composition is unchanged.
We note the following properties of the composition C 3 = C 1 C 2 :
1. 7.4 How tickets enforce delegation control.
It similarly follows that the distinction between a live ticket \2" and a dead ticket \ " represents and supports the SPKI/SDSI rules on delegation. A rule having a dead ticket on the right can only be rewritten by name certs, not by auth certs, whereas a rule having a live ticket may be rewritten by either name certs or auth certs; e ectively authority may be further delegated using auth certs. Thus, the presence of tickets enforces the SPKI/SDSI rules on delegation.
7.5 Using closure to de ne which keys are authorized.
We can also use the closure C + to de ne which keys have permissions derivable from a given starting point \T 2" or \T " for some term T.
De nition 20 Let N be a name in N and 2 a ticket. Alice must then use the certs in the ACL, together with certs she already possesses, to prove that she is authorized. She repeats her request, including a \certi cate chain" demonstrating that her public key is authorized for X, and signs her request with (the secret key corresponding to) her public key.
As an example, suppose that the ACL for X contains the certs: in her subsequent request to access X, which she also signs with her public key K 4 . The guardian for X can examine the certi cate chain to conclude that Alice is indeed authorized.
The problem addressed in this paper is the problem of constructing a suitable certi cate chain, given a collection of certi cates. Some of the certi cates correspond to the ACL (and are issued by \Self "), and some of the certi cates belong to the user.
This problem bears a super cial resemblance to the problem of nding a path in a graph from \Self " to the user's public key, where each certi cate corresponds to a single directed edge. The nodes of such a graph correspond to the names and keys occurring in the certi cates. In simple examples such as the one above where there are no extended names, such an approach actually works ne.
In other examples this simple graph-theoretic approach fails, because name certs can interact to produce new names not previously appearing in any certi cate. For example, the two certi cates: 
(where K i may be \Self "). 4 . Remove useless auth certs. Let C 00 be C 0 after removing all certs of the form (52) having K j 6 = K and a dead ticket on the right; such certs are useless for nding the desired certi cate chain.
5. Use depth-rst search (DFS) to nd a path.
Set up a graph with one vertex for each key, and an edge from K i to K j if there is an auth certi cate C in C 00 of the form (52).
Use depth-rst search to determine if there is a path from Self to K . If not, terminate with failure.
6. Reconstruct the certi cate chain. From the information computed in the previous steps, output the desired certi cate chain.
We now give some details in the following subsections. 9 .1 Using Depth-First-Search to nd a path
After name and name cert elimination, we work with all certi cates (original or derived) of the form (52) for various i and j. There are at most n 2 such certi cates, since there are at most n keys appearing as issuer and n keys occurring in the subjects of the original set of n rules. Another bound on the number of such certi cates is of course C # ; this may be considerably less than O(n 2 ).
We wish to nd if there is a path from Self (a particular distinguished key) to K (the user's key).
This graph problem can be solved by depth-rst search in time proportional to the number of certicates of the form (52) that we are working with 4].
Running-time analysis
The running time of the certi cate-chain discovery algorithm is bounded by the size C # of the name reduction closure C # computed in step 2. As derived in Section 6.7.2, this running time is bounded above O(n 3 l) for a general set of n certi cates with subjects having length at most l. However, the running time improves to O( C # ) which is bounded by O(n 2 l) if the cert cate set C is unambiguous. This completes our presentation of the basic certi cate chain discovery algorithm and its analysis.
Threshold subjects
We now extend our algorithm to handle threshold subjects in auth certs. Threshold subjects can be used to specify a requirement that \k out of m" keys must sign a request in order that the request should be honored. (More precisely, the public keys signing the request must belong to k out of m groups; there may be fewer than k keys signing the request if some keys belong to more than one of the m groups.)
De nition 21 A threshold subject is an expression of the form k (S 1 ; S 2 ; : : : ; S m ) 2 where 1 k m and where each S i is a term or another threshold subject.
A threshold subject may appear only in an authorization cert; it may not appear in a name cert. (The reason that a threshold subject may not appear in a name cert is that a name cert is used to de ne a name as a set of public keys; if a name cert could have a threshold subject as a subject the notion of the value of a name would become too convoluted to be usable in practice.) Here k is the threshold value; at least k of the m subjects must sign an access request.
As an example, consider the following certi cate: Self ?! 2 ( K 0 mit faculty; K 0 intel researcher; K 0 Alice ) 2 :
This certi cate requires that keys representing at least two of the three names sign an access request; equivalently with two of the three groups (MIT faculty, Intel researcher, or Alice) represented. If Alice is an MIT faculty member, then her signature alone is good enough; otherwise two keys must be used to sign the request.
Our previous algorithm can be adapted to handle threshold subjects; this technique follows closely the algorithm made by Elien 6] : Determine V(S) for each subject S appearing in a threshold subject, using a simple variation of the previous name elimination algorithm. One way of implementing such a variation is to replace a threshold cert such as the above by a sequence of ordinary auth certs with dummy issuers: Finally, all of the keys of the proposed signers are marked, and all other vertices are unmarked. Iteratively, each threshold rule is considered, and the issuer is marked if a threshold number of the subjects are marked. This terminates when no more marking can be done. A certi cate chain is found if Self is marked. The running time of this modi ed DFS algorithm is unchanged in the worst case (if we let n denote the number of subjects appearing in the input set of certi cates collectively), since it is linear in the number of vertices and edges of the graph.
The output format of the certi cate chain needs to be extended slightly to handle the threshold subjects. We leave this detail to the SPKI/SDSI standards documents.
Conclusions
We have presented an e cient algorithm for computing certi cate chains for SPKI/SDSI. Thus, SPKI/SDSI has an e cient procedure for answering the fundamental question, \Is A authorized to do X?". While SPKI/SDSI is very expressive, its expressiveness does not come at the price of intractability; sets of SPKI/SDSI certi cates are easy to work with.
